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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Roy Roland Araiza, Sr., appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. He filed a motion to suppress, which was 
denied. He subsequently entered into a conditional plea which preserved his right to 
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Mr. Araiza now appeals and he asserts 
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The following facts were found by the district court concerning Mr. Araiza's 
motion to suppress: Late on January 13, 2013, into the early hours of January 14, 
2013, Mr. Araiza was stopped on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. (R., p.140.) Officer Kevin Loosli responded with his drug dog. 
(R., p.140.) Prior to running the dog around the vehicle and while Mr. Araiza was 
performing field sobriety tests with another officer, Officer Loosli noticed a yellow pill 
imprinted with the number "230" on the driver's seat. (R., p.140.) 
Officer Loosli testified that the pill resembled a prescription pill and not an over-
the-counter pill. (R., p.140.) He also testified that people who have prescriptions 
generally keep their pills in the prescription bottle while those illegally possess 
prescription pills do not. (R., p.140.) Officer Loosli retrieved the pill without asking 
permission from Mr. Araiza. (R., p.140.) The pill was confirmed to be Oxycodone by a 
drug identification search on the internet. (R., p.140.) Mr. Araiza never produced a 
prescription for the pill. (R., p.140.) 
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Mr. vehicle was then searched and officers found methamphetamine. 
(R., p.140.) At the time of the incident, Mr. Araiza was on probation and had agreed to 
certain conditions, including: 
The defendant shall consent to a search of his/her person, residence, 
vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or 
leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling 
authority conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept. of Correction or law 
enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment 
Rights concerning searches. 
(R., p.141.) 
Mr. Araiza was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance 
- one count for methamphetamine/amphetamine and one count for Oxycodone. 
(R., p.49.) The later amended the information allege that Mr. Araiza was a 
persistent violator. (R., p.86.) Mr. Araiza filed a motion to suppress. (R., p.76.) The 
district court denied the motion, holding that the search was permitted by Mr. Araiza's 
probation agreement, and, alternatively, that Officer Loosli lawfully seized the pill 
because it was contraband in plain view, which provided probable cause to search the 
vehicle. (R., p.139.) 
Mr. Araiza eventually entered into a plea agreement in which he entered an 
Alford plea to possession of methamphetamine and preserved the right to appeal from 
the denial of the motion to suppress. (R., pp.233, 243.). The district court imposed a 
sentence of five years indeterminate. (R., p.264.) Mr. Araiza appealed. (R., p.267.) He 
asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Araiza's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Araiza asserts that the prescription pill was not clearly contraband and thus 
was improperly seized and then tested. He also asserts his probation agreement did 
not permit the search in this case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings fact which 
were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 1 Idaho 559, 561 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress 
1. Plain View/Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
provides that search warrants must be based upon probable cause. Warrantless 
searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come within 
several judicially prescribed exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Under the automobile exception, police may search 
an automobile and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe 
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that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Gibson, 141 
Idaho 277, 281 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The plain view doctrine is also one of those exceptions. "The doctrine, simply 
stated, is that if a police officer is where he has a right to be, and he sees something in 
plain view, the observation is not a search and the ensuing seizure ordinarily is not 
subject to Fourth Amendment strictures." State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 558 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
The plain view doctrine contains three requirements. First the officer lawfully 
must be in a position from which he can view the relevant area or object. Coolidge, 
U . at 465-468. Second, if the officer that position due to an intrusion (albeit 
lawful) into a place where a privacy interest exists, he must have acted for a valid law 
enforcement purpose other than to view the object or area in question. This is 
occasionally, and perhaps inaccurately, called the "inadvertent discovery" requirement. 
State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781,788 n. 2,760 P.2d 1197, 1204 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Third, the observed item must have an immediately apparent connection with criminal 
activity. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707 P.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1985). 
An officer may draw reasonable inferences based on his training and experience 
in determining whether this connection exists. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), 
an officer saw a green party balloon on the floor of an automobile. The officer seized the 
balloon, finding it to contain heroin. The Supreme Court upheld the seizure upon the 
plain view doctrine, stating that the balloon's connection with criminal activity was 
immediately apparent to a trained officer. The Court explained that the "immediately 
apparent" requirement means that an officer must have a probable basis to believe an 
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in 
item is connected with criminal activity. Id. at 7 41 
that such a probability existed because the officer 
Court concluded 
saw vials with a white 
powder in the car, the officer knew balloons were used to carry narcotics, and the 
"distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents .... " Id. at 743. 
Mr. Araiza did not contest the stop, and thus does not challenge the officer's right 
to be where he was when he saw the pill. He does, however, challenge the 
"immediately apparent" requirement. And because the pill's connection to illegal activity 
was not immediately apparent, its discovery did not provide the probable cause 
necessary to search the vehicle. 
was pointed out by trial counsel, 
is nothing in [the officer's] testimony that would verify the concept 
that he was able to identify this particular pill as a prescription medication. 
He says it's yellow. It has an imprint. But he has no specific training that 
would permit him to identify it as a prescription medication; and as a 
matter of fact, he was not able to even say today what medication he 
believed it was, whether it was a prescription or not. But again, he clearly 
did not even ask much less know that Mr. Araiza did or did not have a 
prescription for that medication. 
(5/14/13 Tr., p.32, L.14 - p.33, L.1.) Counsel was exactly right. Officer Loosli had no 
idea what the medication was when he seized it. When addressing this issue, the 
district court noted that Officer Loosli testified that, based on his training and 
experience, when pills are possessed under a prescription, the pills are usually in or 
near a prescription bottle and when they are possessed without a prescription, the pills 
are loose or in a container without a prescription. (R., p.151.) The court then held that, 
"such observations, coupled with on-the-job experience, would give a person of 
reasonable caution a strong assumption that the pill was contraband." (R., p.151.) The 
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later found that Officer Loosli had probable cause to 
. (R., p.153.) 
the pill was 
The court analogized the instant situation to that of a drug dog sniff, stating that, 
"considering that a drug dog's alert of the presence of the odor of drugs - whether or 
not drugs are actually present - in a vehicle is sufficient for probable cause to search 
the vehicle, this court believes that an officer's perception of a loose pill appearing to be 
a prescription pill on the driver's seat provides probable cause the pill is contraband." 
(R., p.152.) 
Mr. Araiza submits that this is a poor comparison. A drug dog alerts to specific 
drugs that, by their nature, are contraband. Possessing a prescription pill is not illegal. 
It is only illegal if there is no prescription, and Officer Loosli did not even Mr. Araiza 
if he had a prescription. Under the district court's analysis an officer could see a blood 
pressure or cholesterol pill in a vehicle and, without more, have probable cause to 
search the vehicle. Additionally, Officer Loosli testified to no specific training with 
regard to how prescription medications are stored; his assertions are essentially 
hunches. Officer Loosli's seizure of the pill was illegal, and the fact that the pill was 
indeed a prescription pill did not provide probable cause to search the vehicle. Because 
Officer Loosli's conclusions about the pill are nothing more than hunches, Mr. Araiza 
submits that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
2. Probation Agreement/Waiver 
"Searches conducted pursuant to the supervision of probationers and parolees 
are another exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution." State v. Devore, 
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1 Idaho 344, P.3d 153, 1 App. 2000) (citing State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 
1, 736 P.2d 1 (1987). A search by a probation officer will be deemed reasonable 
and an exception to the Fourth Amendment if "(a) he has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the probationer has violated some condition of probation and (b) the search is 
reasonably related to disclosure or confirmation of that violation." State v. Pinson, 104 
Idaho 227, 233, 657 P.2d 1095, 1101 (Ct. App. 1983). However, "[t]he 'reasonable 
grounds' requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not 
apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement 
that includes a consent to warrantless searches." Devore, 134 Idaho at 347, 2 P.3d at 
157 (citing Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843, 736 at 1297). 
In this case the district court held that the search was authorized by both the 
consent agreement and by the Fourth Amendment waiver. (R., pp.142-49.) The district 
court erred on both counts. 
a. Consent 
When determining whether a search is valid pursuant to a probation agreement, 
one must look to the language of the agreement. The Idaho Supreme Court first 
addressed this issue in State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 842 (1987). In Gawron, the 
defendant entered into the following agreement: 
That probationer does hereby agree and consent to the search of his 
person, automobile, real property, and any other property at any time and 
at any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation 
officer, and does waive his constitutional right to be free from such 
searches. 
Id. at 842 (1987). 'That order indicated that Gawron had certified to a reading and 
understanding of the terms of the order, and that he accepted those terms and signed 
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the " Id. In Gawron, officers searched the defendant's residence while he was 
not present and found contraband and proceeds of burglaries. Id. The Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the search was authorized by the agreement because it was a complete 
waiver. Id. 
In State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009), the order of probation contained 
conditions that the defendant "submit to random blood, breath and/or urine analysis 
upon the request of the Court, his probation officer or any law enforcement official"; and 
(2) he "shall submit to searches of personal property, automobiles and residence 
without a search warrant at the request of his probation officer." On appeal, Purdum 
argued that his consent was limited to random evidentiary testing and not to a seizure of 
his person for such testing. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed. Id. 
More recently, however, the Court of Appeals found a search was not authorized 
by the terms of a probation agreement. In State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 746 (Ct. App. 
2011 ), the agreement stated that the defendant was required to "[s]ubmit to searches of 
his/her person, residence, and any property under his/her control, without a warrant 
pursuant to probation supervision, at the request of the Probation Officer or Law 
Enforcement." The issue in Turek was, "[w]hether a probation condition which requires 
that a probationer submit to warrantless searches "at the request of' a probation officer 
or law enforcement officer requires that the probationer be notified of the search and/or 
consent at the time of the search ... " Id. at 749. The Court of Appeals concluded that, 
"a probation condition that requires a probationer to submit to a search 'at the request 
of' an officer' requires that the probationer be informed of an officer's intent to conduct 
an impending search." Id. at 752. 
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As he did in the district court, Araiza submits that the agreement in this case 
is more similar to the agreement in Turek than in Gawron. Counsel for Mr. Araiza 
explained: 
The difference between the two cases is simply this. In the Gawron case, 
there was a fixed and definite waiver by the defendant of all searches and 
seizures. There was no requirement that he consent. There was no 
language that he shall submit. 
In the Turek case there was indeed that language; and what the Court of 
Appeals said was, indeed he has waived his right. If he is asked to give 
his consent to search the vehicle or the residence, then he shall do so. 
But in that case, Your Honor, there was no request, much like this case, 
where the officer simply conducted a search and then later tried to justify it 
based on consent. 
In that particular instant, the Idaho Court of Appeals was saying this. He 
couldn't refuse, once you asked him. But you t1ave to ask him. And he 
has to consent if you have, in fact, requested that you search his vehicle, 
his home, whatever. 
(5/13/14 Tr., p.34, - p.35, L.18.) 
As set forth above, the agreement in this case states, 
The defendant shall consent to a search of his/her person, residence, 
vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or 
leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling 
authority conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept. of Correction or law 
enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment 
Rights concerning searches. 
(R., p.141.) Unlike Gawron, the agreement in this case states that Mr. Araiza "shall 
consent." The agreement in Gawron stated that the defendant, does "hereby agree and 
consent." The agreement here requires Mr. Araiza to consent in the future, it does not 
state that he agrees and consents at the time of the agreement. Mr. Araiza submits that 
the phrase, "shall consent" is essentially the same as language in Turek that the search 
be "at the request" of an officer. As such, an officer must ask for consent. Pursuant to 
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the agreement, it would be a probation violation refuse that consent, but consent 
must given. 
The district court in this case found the agreement more similar to Purdum than 
Turek. The court held that, "if the phrase 'shall submit to . . . upon the request" 
constitutes a express waiver even when no request is made, then Araiza's condition 
"shall consent to" is correspondingly an express waiver as to searches." (R., pp.146-
47.) 
Mr. Araiza acknowledges the similarities between the two agreements, but notes 
there is an important distinction. Purdum required the defendant to "submit" to a 
search, and the agreement in this case requires Mr. Araiza to "consent." These words 
are not synonyms. "Submit" means "to give over or yield to the power or authority of 
another (often used reflexively)." See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/submit?s=t 
(last visited October 8, 2014). Consent means, "to permit, approve, or agree; comply or 
yield." See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/consent?s=t (last visited October 8, 
2014). Further, the issue of whether Mr. Purdum had been adequately notified of the 
search was not litigated in Purdum. 
Mr. Araiza thus submits that his case is closest to Turek, and the agreement 
required the officer to request consent before searching the vehicle. Because the 
officer did not request this consent, Mr. Araiza asserts that the vehicle search was 
illegal and evidence found in the search must be suppressed. 
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b. Waiver 
The district court also held that the final sentence in the agreement constituted a 
waiver of Mr. Araiza's Fourth Amendment rights and denied the suppression motion on 
that basis. (R., pp.148-19.) With regard to waiver, counsel for Mr. Araiza argued, 
[The agreement] says nothing about his rights under the Idaho 
Constitution, Your Honor. He waives his Fourth Amendment rights. What 
does that mean? I don't know. 
If it said, [Mr. Araiza] waives all of rights to an illegal search and seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment and Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, 
that might be more meaningful. But there's nothing in this case to indicate 
that [Mr. Araiza] ever waived his rights under the Idaho Constitution. 
(5/13/14 Tr., p.41, Ls.3-13.) Counsel was exactly right. The final sentence of 
Mr. Araiza's agreement states, "The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment 
Rights concerning searches." It contains no waiver of any rights pursuant to the Idaho 
Constitution. The district court held that, "the argument that somehow Araiza could 
waive his Fourth Amendment rights and not the identical rights under the Idaho 
Constitution is unavailing and - as both cover the same areas - would mean that the 
Fourth Amendment waiver is meaningless if the Idaho rights remain." (R., p.149.) 
Accepting Mr. Araiza's argument might mean that the Fourth Amendment waiver 
is essentially meaningless in this case, but that is not a basis to deny a suppression 
motion. 1 And the fact that the rights are nearly identical is irrelevant. Mr. Araiza is 
guaranteed his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by two 
sources - the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of 
1 It would not make the waiver meaningless altogether, as a defendant is required to 
cite to the Idaho Constitution in order to assert to those rights in a suppression motion. 
Thus, a defendant who moved to suppress only on the basis of a Fourth Amendment 
violation would not be able to assert Idaho constitutional protection. 
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Idaho and he only waived the rights from one source. Had the 
to waive the rights protected by both of these sources, it could easily have 
done so in the agreement. It did not. Further, to the extent that the agreement is 
ambiguous, ambiguous contacts are construed against the drafting party. See, e.g., 
Barber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 677, 680 (1997). Because 
Mr. Araiza did not waive any rights pursuant to the Idaho Constitution and moved to 
suppress on the basis of a violation of the Idaho Constitution, the district court erred by 
holding that he waived his right to challenge the search in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Araiza respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2014. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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